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Abstract
We study the impact of employment quota on rms' demand for disabled workers. The
Austrian Disabled Persons Employment Act (DPEA) requires rms to provide at least one
job to a disabled worker per 25 non-disabled workers, a rule which is strictly enforced by
non-compliance taxation. We nd that, as a result of the discontinuous nature of the non-
compliance tax, rms exactly at the quota threshold employ 0.05 (20 % in relative terms)
more disabled workers than rms just below the threshold { an eect that is unlikely driven
by purposeful selection below the threshold. The at rate nature of the non-compliance tax
generates strong employment eects for low-wage rms and weak eects for high-wage rms.
We also nd that growing rms passing the quota threshold react with a substantial time-lag
but the magnitude of the long-run eect is similar to the one found in cross-section contrasts.
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Integrating disabled workers is a key challenge in employment policy. One out of of seven
individuals who live in OECD countries report a health problem that limits activities of daily
life (OECD, 2003). Employment matters tremendously for disabled individuals' economic well-
being. The work incomes of disabled individuals with a job are nearly as high as those of
individuals without a disability. In contrast, the nancial resources available to a disabled
individual without a job are 46 % lower than the disposable income of an employed disabled
individual. Even though work is of crucial importance for disabled individuals' material standard
of living, their employment rates are substantially below those of the non-disabled.
This paper studies whether an employment quota for rms can help increase the demand
for disabled workers. We study the case of Austria, where the Disabled Persons Employment
Act (DPEA) denes specic employment targets, coupled with nancial incentives for meeting
these targets. Understanding the eects of the quota is important for several reasons. First,
the two most important policies for encouraging employment of disabled workers among OECD
member countries are anti-discrimination legislation and employment quotas. While the eects
of anti-discrimination policies are quite well understood, the eects of employment quotas on
rms' employment decisions have not yet been explored. Second, labor economists have long
attempted to understand the importance of nancial incentives in labor demand (Hamermesh,
1993). The employment quota policy allows studying rms' reaction to a sharp change in the
relative cost of employing disabled and non-disabled workers. Arguably, this design provides
important information on the extent to which rms are willing to substitute disabled workers
for non-disabled workers. Third, legislation very similar to that in Austria is in force in many
other OECD countries (or has been so until very recently, as in the U.K). (table 1 provides
an overview). While these regulations have a core component in the form of a mandatory
employment quota in common, they dier in the quota amount (ranging from 7% in Italy to
2% in Korea and Spain), in the targeted rms, and in the sanctions in case of non{compliance
(ranging from 0.25% of the monthly pay-roll for rms in Germany to 4% in Italy). Hence, while
the case of Austria may seem special prima facie, we believe that our results are also of high
policy relevance beyond the Austrian borders.
Table 1 about here
Under Austrian law, rms have to hire at least one disabled individual per 25 non-disabled
employees. Firms that fail to comply with this obligation are subject to a tax for each unlled
quota slot. This tax is non-negligible and amounts to somewhat more than e 200 per month (or
6.3 percent of the average wage of Austrian employees). The tax revenues are used to subsidize
rms that provide employment to disabled workers (regardless of whether they are subject to
2the employment quota). Our empirical strategy exploits the discontinuous change in nancial
incentives the employment quota creates. To identify the causal eect of the non-compliance
tax on threshold rms employing 25 (or 50, 75, etc.) non-disabled workers, we compare the
number of disabled workers in rms just below and just above the quota threshold. The central
idea of this identication strategy is this: When a rm with 25 non-disabled workers decides
not to hire a disabled worker, it has to pay the non-compliance tax. In contrast, when a rm
with 24 non-disabled workers does not hire a disabled worker, it is not subject to this tax. We
can therefore estimate the causal eect of the employment quota on the demand for disabled
workers by comparing rms at the threshold to those just below it.
The key identifying assumption of this strategy is that rms do not endogenously self-select
below thresholds to avoid becoming subject to the employment quota. We discuss the validity of
this assumption by studying four indicators that would help detect such a self-selection. First,
endogenous self-selection is expected to result in a discontinuity in the rm size distribution.
Our empirical evidence indicates that there is no such discontinuity. Second, if rms wanted
to avoid becoming subject to the employment obligation, rms below quota thresholds would
grow more slowly than those at the threshold. We nd no such pattern in the data. Third,
the two populations of rms below and above thresholds are identical in terms of a range
of observable characteristics. Finally, endogenous self-selection by rms which want to avoid
employing disabled workers would result in an dip in terms of the number of disabled workers
employed just below quota thresholds. We do not see such a dip. Thus, a comprehensive
set of indicators is consistent with the central identifying assumption that rms just below
thresholds provide valid information on the employment decisions of threshold rms without the
quota system. This suggests that the employment quota creates a sharp regression discontinuity
design.1 The causal impact of employment quota can therefore be identied by comparing
employment decisions of threshold rms to those of rms just below thresholds.
The empirical analysis documents ve important results. First, rms facing the obligation to
employ disabled workers do in fact employ more disabled workers than similar rms without
this obligation. A comparison of rms just above the quota threshold to those just below the
threshold shows that roughly 1 in 20 rms around the rst threshold (25 non-disabled workers)
have a disabled worker on the payroll whom they would have not hired in the absence of the
employment quota. The average eect at higher order thresholds (50, 75, ...) is roughly twice
as large. Both estimates suggest that rms are quite willing to substitute between disabled
and non-disabled workers (with an elasticity of substitution of around 2.4 at the rst threshold
1The RDD has been used in a number of studies to measure causal eects. See Angrist and Lavy (1999),
DiNardo and Lee (2004), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Lalive (2008), etc. for studies assessing the causal eects
of unions, social assistance, or unemployment benets on labor market outcomes.
3and around 0.7 at higher order thresholds)2. Second, rms need a substantial amount of time
to comply with employment quota rules. When a set of growing rms passes the rst quota
threshold (25 employees), only 1 in 170 rms around this threshold fullls the employment
obligation in the rst month; this increases slowly to 1 in 33 rms after 2 years. This indicates
substantial frictions in hiring disabled workers. Third, the per-head nature of the non-compliance
tax is expected to generate a stronger nancial incentive for rms that pay low wages than
for those paying high wages. Consistent with these nancial incentives, we nd that rms'
response to the per-head non-compliance tax decreases monotonically with a rm's position
in the wage distribution. Fourth, our empirical analysis reveals dierences in the impact of
the non-compliance tax with respect to industry. While the quote eect is signicant in all
industries, rms in the services sector and construction rms display below-average responses to
quota, while manufacturing rms react more strongly than average. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that technology plays an important role in the extent to which rms can accommodate
disabled workers. Finally, we explore the extent to which rms' employment decisions merely
reect poaching from other rms rather than creating or maintaining employment. We nd that
roughly 50 % of the employment eect can be attributed to workers already employed by the
rm on the date of acquiring formal disability status. About 42 % of excess employment can
be attributed to workers who were employed by other rms at the time of acquiring disability
status. The remaining 8 % of excess employment goes to individuals who were not employed at
the time of acquiring disability status.
The existing literature has extensively studied the eects of anti-discrimination legislation for
disabled individuals. Using state-by-state variation in the timing of passage of the the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), DeLeire (2000), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), and Beegle and
Stock (2003) nd that the ADA has not improved employment of disabled individuals in the U.S.
and may, in some cases, have even reduced their employment chances. Kruse and Schur (2003)
challenge this nding, arguing that the data used in the earlier studies may not have provided
precise information on disability status. Jolls and Prescott (2004) and Jolls (2004) argue that
the ADA increased education participation by those individuals for whom the ADA probably
oered improved employment prospects, and argue that increased education participation is the
result of an increase in the return on further education. Bell and Heitmueller (2005) study
the eects of the Disability Discrimination Act in the U.K. Their results conrm that, as in
the U.S., disability legislation did not have a signicant impact on employment prospects for
2We calculated this elasticity as follows: we nd a discontinuous increase in the number of disabled workers of
roughly 20.6% at the rst threshold, where the non{compliance tax amounts to e 150, and the the average of the
median monthly wage of a non-disabled worker employed at rms around the rst threshold amounts to roughly
e 1,800. Thus the elasticity of substitution is 2.4 (= 20:6=[(150=1;800)  100]). The same calculation for higher
order thresholds yields 0.7 (= 5:3=[(150=1;950)  100]).
4disabled individuals in the U.K. 3 The existing literature on the eects of employment quota
is rather sparse. The only empirical study we know on the role of the employment quota is
Wagner et al. (2001).4 Their paper assesses the impact of the employment quota in Germany
on job dynamics in 400 small rms and nds no eect of the quota threshold.
This paper contributes to the literature in at least three dimensions. First, this paper adds to
the literature by adopting a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal eect of the
employment quota on the employment of disabled workers. While a large number of studies have
looked at the eects of anti-discrimination legislation with respect to disabled workers, we are
not aware of previous studies that attempt to evaluate the eect of quota rules on employment
of disabled workers. Second, our evaluation is based on high-quality data from Austrian private
rms and their (disabled and non-disabled) workers. In fact, we use the same data sources the
Austrian social welfare authorities use to determine compliance with employment quota: the
Austrian Social Security Data (ASSD) linked to data from the Austrian Federal Welfare Oce
(FWO). The former data set allows us to calculate the exact size of the labor force (divided into
disabled and non-disabled workers) of every single Austrian rm. The latter data set allows us
to assess the number of individuals with formal disability status within each rm. Since our data
set covers all of the almost 240,000 Austrian private sector rms, we can provide informative
contrasts of rms just below and just above the quota threshold to estimate the quota eect.
Third, by providing evidence for low-wage and high-wage rms, for the employment dynamics of
disabled workers within a rm, and for the employed disabled worker's disability/employment
history, our study sheds light on potentially important mechanisms where quota rules have an
impact on employment of disabled workers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of institutional
environment in Austria. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 outlines the empirical
strategy. Our main results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 The Disabled Persons Employment Act
The Disabled Persons Employment Act (DPEA) was implemented in Austria in 1969; it forms
the legal basis of the Austrian employment quota system. It denes the process by which
individuals acquire the formal status of being \severely disabled", regulates the employment
obligations for rms and the nancial sanctions associated with non-compliance of these obli-
gations, species rules on how to pay out subsidies to rms employing disabled workers, and
3See also Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2003) and Verick (2004) who study the eects of German anti-
discrimination legislation.
4See Welch (1976) for an early theoretical attempt to characterize the eects of quota on the labor market.
5introduces employment protection rules for disabled workers. The quota rule obliges rms to
hire one disabled worker per 25 non-disabled workers, leading to a quota of 4 %.5 Firms that do
not comply with this obligation are subject to a non-compliance tax. This tax is the same for
each non-hired disabled worker and is independent of the wage bill paid in the particular rm.
The non-compliance tax steadily increased from e 118 in 1990 to e 150 in the rst half of 2001,
was increased by e 46 to e 196 on July 1, 2001, and reached e 206 in 2006. This amounts to
roughly 6.3 % of a worker's average monthly salary or 0.7 % of a rm's average monthly payroll
in the Austrian private sector in 2006.6
The process by which individuals acquire the formal status of a disabled individual is as follows.
In order to become entitled, disabled individuals have to le an application with the Austrian
Federal Welfare Oce (FWO). The application is approved once a FWO medical expert assesses
a physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory disorder which reduces the individual's work capacity
by at least 50 percent. Employers do not have a direct inuence on the process of obtaining
the formal disability status for at least two reasons. On the one hand, workplace or other
accidents that lead to a sudden change in work capacity almost always trigger the disability
application process automatically. On the other hand, one could argue that employers below
the quota threshold might have an incentive to persuade a de facto disabled individual to abstain
from acquiring the disability status. However, this is unlikely as these individuals would forego
substantial advantages in terms of employment protection.
The group of individuals with the formal disability status comprises a non-negligible proportion
of the Austrian work force. In 1999, the time period of our analysis, about 80,000 individuals
or 2 % of aggregate employment were registered as disabled according to the law.7 Recall that
the employment quota species that 4 % of each rm's workforce be employees registered as
disabled. This means that the group of registered disabled individuals is too small to achieve
full compliance with the employment quota. The non-compliance tax is thus a de-facto tax on
rms who employ at least 25 non-disabled workers.
The FWO directly enforces the employment obligation, by checking the size of each rm and
the number of employed disabled workers on the rst day of each month. The exact calculation
of the employment quota takes the particular disabilities into account. There is some double-
weighting, i.e. particular groups of disabled workers are equivalent to two disabled workers,
which include the (i) blind, (ii) disabled individuals of age 19 years or younger, (iii) disabled
5The Austrian quota is lower than that in Germany (5 %), France (6 %), Poland (6 %), and Italy (7%); but
it is higher than that in Belgium, Korea, and Spain (2 %).
6In addition to the increase in the non{compliance tax increase of almost 30%, another important policy
change took place on January 1, 1999. Before that, rms that employed more disabled individuals than the
DPEA demanded were granted a premium in the amount of the non-compliance tax per month for each excessive
disabled employee. However, this rule was abolished on January 1, 1999.
7See Humer et al. (2007) for more information on the number of individuals who are registered disabled in
Austria.
6apprentices, (iv) disabled individuals of age 50 or older with a degree of disability of at least
70 percent, (v) disabled individuals of 55 years or older, and (vi) individuals in a wheelchair.
Finally, the FWO levies a non-compliance tax on rms that do not fulll the employment quota.
The DPEA also denes how the revenues collected through non-compliance taxes are to be
spent. The main beneciaries are rms (and their disabled employees) who actually oer em-
ployment to disabled workers. These subsidies, either in form of allowances or loans, support
those rms which employ at least one disabled worker. In particular, they are granted for ad-
equate workplace accommodation, wage subsidies, work assistance, occupational retraining, or
professional development. Basically, this represents a reallocation of resources from rms that
fail to comply with the quota rule to rms that employ at least one disabled worker; the real-
location is used to compensate the latter for their eort in employing disabled workers. Note,
however, that the subsidies are available to all rms, not just to those subject to the employment
obligation. The subsidies granted in 2005 amounted to roughly e 65 Mio.
Finally, the DPEA provides increased employment protection for disabled workers, i.e. protec-
tion from dismissal and protection from wage cuts due to disability. The increased protection
against dismissal is twofold. On the one hand, it stipulates that a contract may only be ter-
minated after a probationary period of at least 4 weeks. Furthermore, dismissal is only valid
if a special FWO committee agrees to it; dismissals without the consent of this committee are
unlawful. However, the increased dismissal protection rst comes into eect after a probationary
period of six months has elapsed. The probationary period originally amounted to one month,
and was extended in two steps, rst from one to three months on January 1, 1999 and then from
three to six months (which is currently in force) on July 1, 2001.
2.2 Hypotheses
How do quota rules and the associated nancial sanctions aect rms' incentive to employ a
disabled workers? Recall that work capacity must be reduced by at least 50% in order to
qualify for the status \registered disabled". This means that a disabled worker's productivity
is arguably lower than that of a non-disabled worker. Since rms are required by law to pay
disabled workers the same wages as non-disabled workers, there is a gap in terms of the marginal
prot from employing a non-disabled worker compared to a disabled worker.
DPEA changes this situation in two respects. First, DPEA generally subsidizes employment
of disabled workers by paying for workplace adjustments and also by covering direct wage and
training subsidies. These subsidies serve to reduce the productivity gap between disabled and
non-disabled workers. Second, the non-compliance tax generates a discontinuous increase on the
order of 6.3 % in the relative cost of employing a non-disabled worker compared to employing
a disabled worker at the quota threshold. Since subsidies are available to all rms regardless of
7their non-disabled workforce, comparing threshold rms to those just below the threshold identi-
es substitution eects of small changes in the relative cost in a context with small productivity
gaps between non-disabled and disabled workers. In this context, even small changes in cost can
lead to large changes in rm's employment decisions.
Moreover, we expect that the eects of the non-compliance tax depends on a rm's position
in the wage distribution and on technology. With regard to wages, the at rate nature of the
tax implies that the incentive to employ disabled workers will be stronger for rms at the lower
end of the wage distribution than for rms at the upper end of the wage distribution. We
therefore assess the eect of the non-compliance tax for rms grouped by the quartiles of the
rm wage distribution. With regard to technology, the non-compliance tax will be more eective
in promoting employment in rms where productivity is less sensitive to disability related work
impediments. Using industry as a proxy for technology, we therefore assess the eects of the
non-compliance tax by industry.
The nal key question examines the extent to which rms' employment decisions merely reect
poaching from other rms rather than creating or maintaining employment. We assess this
important issue by analyzing three groups of disabled workers: workers who had already been
with the rm when acquiring the protected status, workers who had been employed by other
rms at that time, and individuals who were not-employed when applying for protection. Full
reallocation of disabled workers can be detected by decomposing the quota employment eect.
Full reallocation means that all excess employment in threshold rms goes to workers from other
rms. Employment promoting eects of the quota show up for former employees (with threshold
rms maintaining their jobs), or for individuals who were not employed when registering for
protection (new employment).
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
To assess the impact of the employment quota on the rms' hiring decisions with respect to
disabled workers, we use register data from two dierent sources: (i) the Austrian Social security
database (ASSD), which contains detailed information on the individuals' employment history
and characteristics from 1972{2002 on a daily basis together with an unambiguous rm identier,
as well as rms' industry aliation and location and (ii) personal data from the Austrian Federal
Welfare Oce (FWO) which reports disability status, disability type, and disability degree for
all individuals disabled in the sense of the Employment Act for Disabled Individuals (DPEA).
One advantage of this type of information is that a medical procedure (rather than self-reported
by rms or workers) objectively assesses disability status. Note, however, that the FWO data
set is inow-based; its records began in January 1970. This means that the stock of disabled
8workers might be incompletely captured in the early stages of this data. This drawback gradually
vanishes if a snapshot of the stock of disabled workers is taken at a later time. Accordingly, we
will only use data from very recent years (see below for details). The ASSD and FWO data
can be linked on the basis of a person identier. This allows us to calculate two crucial pieces
of information accurately: the number of the non-disabled workers and the number of disabled
workers each rm employs. The former variables determines whether a rm is required to hire a
disabled worker and the latter represents how many disabled workers each rm actually employs.
Hence we can precisely determine whether and and the extent to which a rm complies with
the employment quota. The FWO checks rms' compliance with the employment quota on the
rst day each month. We account for this administrative modus operandi by creating a data set
with monthly reference dates, all of which correspond to the rst day of each month.8
Since the 1990s, two major changes relevant for the employment quota occurred in the DPEA:
(i) an \over-compliance premium" (of the same amount as the non-compliance tax) was aban-
doned on January 1, 1999 and (ii) the non-compliance tax was increased to e 200 on July 1,
2001.9 We restrict our sample to the time period between January 1999 and and June 2000 for
two reasons. First, these policy changes do not aect this time span. Second, as the FWO data
only provide information on the inow into recognized disability starting in 1970, restricting the
sample to dates after 1999 makes it very likely that our data capture the entire stock of disabled
workers.10 We further restrict the analysis to rms in the private sector { those likely to pursue
a clear, prot maximizing objective. In particular, we look at rms operating in the services
sector, manufacturing, construction, and the tourism industry.
We focus on rms' employment decisions with respect to disabled workers just above and just
below quota thresholds T 2 f25;50;75;:::g. This sample restriction eectively means that we
study the eect of quota rules on rms (i) on the margin of entering the employment quota
system when the quota threshold T = 25 is considered, and (ii) on the margin of being induced
to hire an (additional) disabled worker when any quota threshold T > 25 is considered. We
dene just above and just below as rms with rm size S 2 [T   12;T + 12]. This bandwidth
is the largest bandwidth that does not result in overlapping rm sizes across thresholds.11 We
8Note that simply hiring a disabled worker for only one day a month (i.e. the rst day of each month) in order
to comply with the employment quota is not feasible for rms. An imposed regulatory restriction of the DPEA
rules out this behavior. It even turns out that the average number of working days { including weekends { are
slightly higher for disabled than for non-disabled workers. The average (s.d.) number amounts to 30.12 (1.86)
days for disabled and 29.93 (1.39) for non-disabled workers.
9The non-compliance tax is adjusted annually by means of a matching factor determined by the general social
security act (Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz).
10In 2000, the mean retirement was 59 years for men and 57 years for women. This means that our data does
not provide information on disability status for those individuals who attained the recognized disabled status
before they were 30 years old. Since less than one fourth of the disabled individuals attain disabled status before
this age, we do not expect this drawback in our data to be of major signicance.
11When analyzing the rst threshold with this bandwidth, rm sizes up to 37 (= 25+12) are taken into account.
The smallest rm size considered for the analysis at the second threshold amounts to 38 (= 50   12). Increasing
the bandwidth would therefore lead to overlapping rm sizes across thresholds.
9test the sensitivity of the results to the choice of bandwidth by further restricting the sample to
S 2 [T  9;T +9] as well as S 2 [T  6;T +6]. It turns out that our main ndings are not sensitive
to the choice of bandwidth. Restricting the analysis to observations close to the quota threshold
is important since, not surprisingly, rm size turns out to be an important predictor of disabled
employment. Note, as we discuss in section 4, we will not only control for the eect of rm size
by sample restriction, but will also use regression techniques to further account for the eects
of rm size. Finally, note that the number of rm{month observations is largely decreasing
in rm size. There are therefore only very few rm{month observations for very large rms.
In order to cover all possible rm size values around each threshold, we only keep rm{month
observations associated with a threshold with a complete set of rm size values. As a result,
we only consider rm-month observations around the 1st   37th;42nd;and 50th threshold. In
the light of very few rm{month observations around thresholds T > 25, we decided to pool
rm{month observations around these thresholds, i.e. we assign treatment status according to
the deviation from thresholds ~ Si  (Si   T), where T represents the nearest threshold Si is
associated with. Firms are treated if ~ Si  0 and non-treated if ~ Si < 0.
Table 2 reports key background statistics on rms located around the threshold T = 25. Panel
A of table 2 shows the two key indicators. The rst line provides information on the average
number of jobs provided to registered disabled individuals in treated and control rms. We
calculate the number of disabled workers per rm in the same way as the FWO, i.e. it is calculated
by double weighting particular groups of disabled individuals (see section 2). Control rms
provide on average 0.19 work places to disabled individuals. This means that about 1 in 5 rms
employs a disabled worker even in the absence of an employment obligation. In contrast, treated
rms which have passed the quota threshold employ about 0.42 disabled workers, roughly twice
as many as non-treated rms do. Thus, prima facie evidence is consistent with an employment
promoting eect of the quota rule.
Table 2 about here
Row 2 of panel A of table 2 clearly indicates that treated and control rms are quite dierent
and hence comparing the raw dierential does not provide causal evidence on the eects of
employment quota. Treated rms are, by construction, larger than control rms. Whereas
control rms employ 17.10 non-disabled workers on average, treated rms employ almost 30.13
non-disabled workers { again almost twice as many as control rms. To the extent that rm
size is important in oering jobs to disabled workers, prima facie evidence is likely to be biased.
Panel B of table 2 displays information on rm size dynamics. The indicator \unchanged
workforce since last month" measures stability of workforce between month t and month t   1.
The indicator \expanded since 6 months" measures whether rm size in month t is strictly larger
10than rm size in month t 6. The indicator \contracted since 6 months" measures whether rm
size in t is strictly smaller than in month t   6. Results indicate that 41 % of control rms did
not see any change in their workforce over a month, whereas this is true only for 25 % of the
rms above the quota threshold. In terms of rm growth, results indicate that 45 % of control
rms and 47 % of the treated rms expanded their employment during that past 6 months.
In contrast, 39 % of treated rms downsized within the last six months compared to 34 % of
control rms. This suggests that treated and control rms dier strongly in terms of stability
of the workforce and in terms of downsizing, but less so in terms of rm growth.
Panel C of table 2 provides further background information on rms. It reports information on
a rms' workforce structure, pay, age, tenure, and apprentices. Note that all of these measures
only take non-disabled workers employed by the rm in month t into account. In terms of rms'
workforce structure, results indicate that the average control rm employs 44 % white-collar
workers, which is also true for treated rms. In contrast, female employment is substantially
higher among control rms (41 % women) than among treated rms (38 % women). This
dierence is, arguably, due to the fact that control rms are considerably smaller than treated
rms; it should thus disappear once the dierences in rm size are reduced. Control rms'
employees are on average 35.4 years old, whereas treated rms employ individuals who are
slightly older (35.7 years). In order to measure the level of pay for each rm, we also report
information on the median daily wage each rm pays its employees on the rst day of month
t. Results focus on the median wage since ASSD wage information is censored from above
for about 20 % of employees covered by ASSD. Results indicate that control rms pay their
employees about 59.8 e per day (or about 1764 e per month), whereas treated rms pay almost
3 e per day more (62.6 e per day or 1878 e per month). Firms located around the rst quota
threshold face a non-compliance tax of e 150 { or about 8 % of the median wage they pay their
non-disabled workforce. Control rm employees have been working for their current employer
on average for 5.3 years whereas treated workers have been with their employer slightly longer
(5.6 years). Finally, treated rms provide about 2 jobs to apprentices, which is considerably
more than control rms (1.4 jobs).
Panel D of table 2 contains information on rms that the treatment should not aect, i.e.
variables that are pre-determined with respect to the DPEA: rm age, location, and industry.
Firm age measures the number of years the rm number has been observed in ASSD since 1972 {
the year ASSD started.12 Results indicate that the average control rm was founded 15.9 years
12Note that this implies that rm age is left censored. Left censoring is not problematic in this application
because the focus of this paper is to measure the eects of the employment quota on employment of disabled
workers. This means that information on rm age is merely used to control for dierences between treated rms
and control rms. Moreover, rm age will turn out to be balanced between threshold rms. This implies that left
censoring of rm age is unlikely to bias estimates of the eect of employment quota on employment of disabled
workers.
11before the current date, whereas treated rms were established almost exactly 1 year earlier.
While there are no strong dierences in terms of rm location, there are moderate dierences in
terms of industry. Whereas 30 % of treated rms are in manufacturing, the corresponding gure
is only 28 % for control rms. In contrast, 11 % of control rms are in the tourism industry,
while only 9 % of the treated rms are.
The gures of Panel B and C of table 2 reveal that there are some dierences between treated
and non-treated rms in variables that directly relate to rm size (and thus to the treatment
status) and to pre-determined covariates. This means that simply contrasting treated and control
rms does not provide information on the causal eect of employment quota on the employment
decisions of Austrian rms. The following section discusses the more rened framework we use
in the empirical analysis. Descriptive statistics for the pooled higher thresholds are available in
table 3 in the appendix.
4 Identication and Estimation
Our empirical strategy is based on the fact that the DPEA discontinuously changes the nancial
incentives for employing disabled workers. The DPEA requires that rms hire a disabled worker
if the size of the rm (as measured by the number of non-disabled workers) Si is greater than
or equal to the quota threshold T 2 f25;50;75;:::g. Firms that do not comply are subject to a
non-compliance tax. This creates nancial incentives for rms to hire disabled workers as rms
face a trade-o between hiring a disabled worker or paying a compensation to be rid of this
obligation.
To identify the causal eect of employment quota on employment of disabled workers, we
adopt a regression discontinuity (RD) design. The RD design allows identication of the causal
eect of the employment quota for rms located at the quota threshold T. The RD design
in the DPEA context is sharp, i.e. the probability of having to pay the tax for not providing
a job to a disabled worker changes from zero to one at the threshold. This means that the
discontinuity at the assignment threshold reects the average causal eect for threshold rms.
The key identifying assumption for this result is that the expected number of disabled workers
in absence of the employment quota is continuous at the threshold (Hahn et al. (2001)).13 In
terms of the potential outcomes approach, the validity of our empirical strategy hinges on the
assumption that the potential outcome for non-treated rms is independent of rm size at the
threshold (i.e. a local exclusion restriction).
The following linear regression allows identication of the discontinuity in the average number
13This basically means that the demand of rms for disabled workers is continuous at the threshold in absence
of the employment quota. Note that this also applies for the labor supply of disabled workers, since all provisions
provided by the DPEA (increased employment protection, wage subsidies, workplace accommodation, etc.) are
available independently of the rm size.
12of disabled workers per rm at treatment assignment thresholds T 2 f25;50;75;:::g:
Yit = 0 + 1  Dit + 0  (Sit   T) + 1  Dit  (Sit   T) + X0
it + t + it; (1)
where Yit denotes the number of disabled workers, Dit indicates whether a rm is treated or
not, and Sit denotes rm size of rm i at date t. Including Sit is important since larger rms
tend to provide more jobs to disabled workers.
The key parameter is 1. This parameter measures the average causal eect of DPEA on the
number of disabled workers for rms at the quota threshold T. 0 measures the average number
of disabled workers for rms just below the assignment threshold T. The parameters 0 and 1
capture the correlation between rm size Sit and the average number of disabled workers per
rm. In some specications, we additionally control for X0
it (a vector containing all covariates
displayed in Panel B-D of table 2 or table 3 respectively) and time xed eects t (30 monthly
dummies). X0
it allows improving the precision of the RDD estimates, and t controls for changes
over time that potentially aect the hiring strategy of either disabled or non-disabled workers,
such as economic conditions, for example. It turns out, however, that the results are neither
sensitive to the inclusion of X0
it nor t.
There are three issues of particular relevance in the present context. First, note that rm
size Sit has discrete support. Discrete support implies that we need to extrapolate in order to
predict the counterfactual for threshold rms { the number of disabled workers threshold rms
employ in the absence of the ne. The baseline model assumes a linear functional form, but we
also add quadratic terms in Sit as a sensitivity analysis. Moreover, we only consider rms within
a window of size 12 below and above the threshold, thus Sit 2 [T   12;T + 12]. This sample
restriction is intended to downplay the importance of the functional form between the mean
number of disabled workers and non-disabled rm size. Note that this is the largest bandwidth
that ensures non-overlapping rm sizes across thresholds. We test the sensitivity of our results
with respect to the choice of bandwidth by further restricting the sample to rms with rm sizes
Si 2 [T  9;T +9] and Si 2 [T  6;T +6]. It turns out that the choice of bandwidth does not drive
our main ndings. Discrete support also aects variance-covariance matrix estimates. Lee and
Card (2008) suggest using cluster-consistent standard errors (clustered on the distinct values of
Si) to account for the uncertainty related to the choice of the functional form. Furthermore,
remember that we use pooled cross-section data for the econometric analysis. Observations of
the same rm cannot be considered to be independent from each other. Thus, we not only need
to cluster on Sit but also on rms (note that this is non-nested). Cameron et al. (2006) propose
a new variance estimator for OLS that provides cluster-robust inference when there is two-way
clustering that is non-nested. As a consequence, we report two types of robust standard errors
13in our regression outputs: standard errors that are (i) clustered on Sit and (ii) those that are
clustered on Sit and rm identiers.
Second, the baseline specication may be sensitive to unobserved rm heterogeneity, and it
does not provide information on the timing of rms' employment decisions. Comparing threshold
rms to those just below the threshold regardless of how long threshold rms have been subject
to the quota, the baseline strategy provides an estimate of the long-run eect of employment
quota on disabled employment. We assess sensitivity to unobserved heterogeneity and timing
of rms' employment decisions in three ways. We begin by estimating the baseline specication
by rm xed eects to identify the employment quota eect; we use rms that cross the quota
threshold within the sample period of 30 months. This provides a medium-run estimate of the
employment quota on threshold rms which is unaected by the presence of time invariant rm
heterogeneity. We then add an interaction term between the treatment dummy Dit with the
number of months a rm had been exposed to the quota in the baseline model in the past, i.e.
Dit
Pt 1
j=0 Dij, and re-estimate it by rm xed eects. This allows assessing both the immediate
eect of crossing the threshold as well as the dynamics of the treatment eect for rms that
cross the threshold within the sample period. We ultimately provide estimates of the treatment
eect in a series of dierence models. The rst dierence specication of the baseline model {
relating the month{to{month change in disabled employment to the month{to{month change
in treatment status { identies the immediate impact of crossing the threshold. We also provide
estimates at higher order dierences to assess how time since crossing the threshold aects
disabled employment.
Third, we assess whether there is endogenous selection of rms at the quota threshold studying
rm size density, rm dynamics, and pre-determined characteristics of rms. Regarding rm
size, rms might stay just below the threshold in order to avoid becoming subject to the non-
compliance tax. If this endogenous sorting behavior related to the DPEA is present, we would
expect a spike in the rm size distribution just below the threshold. Figure 1 reports the rm size
distribution around the quota threshold T = 25. Visual inspection suggests that no important
spike is present.14
14We also formally test for the presence of a discontinuity in the rm size distribution (see McCrary (2008)).
We run a regression in the avor of the baseline model extended with quadratic terms in S (which is appropriate
with regard to gure 1), where we used the rm size density as a dependent variable. A rm size bandwidth
Sit 2 [T   12;T + 12] is used, yielding 25 observations. It turns out that the rm size density is 0.42 percentage
points lower at the quota threshold than would be expected from information on rms below the threshold. This
dierence is statistically signicantly dierent from zero at the 5 %-level of signicance (p-value of 0.03). However,
when we run the same regression for a set of placebo thresholds  T 2 f13;14;:::;23;24; 26;27;:::;37g using the
density for rm sizes ranging from 1 to 49, we also nd discontinuities at these placebo thresholds which tend to
be somewhat larger at lower rm sizes and then level o as rm size increases. Moreover, the discontinuity at the
true threshold 25 is well in line with the discontinuities estimated at placebo thresholds. These results suggest
that the discontinuity in the rms size density estimated at the quota threshold is a statistical artifact rather
than due to purposeful self-selection by rms. Furthermore, pooled quota thresholds T > 25 gure 2, detailed
in the appendix, also fail to show a spike. An application of the same formal test as for quota threshold T = 25
yields no discontinuity around quota thresholds T > 25 (using a linear as well as a quadratic functional form).
14Figure 1 about here
With regard to rm dynamics, we look at the rms' employment uctuation and employment
growth. The idea is that rms just below the threshold avoid growing, whereas no such restriction
on rm growth exists at other rm sizes. For the same reason we expect higher employment
stability just below the threshold. Again, we run regressions in the avor of the baseline model
but use the following three dependent variables: (i) i.e. whether a rm has had any changes in
its workforce from t   1 to t, (ii) whether a rm has expanded between t   6 and t, and (iii)
whether a rm has contracted between t   6 and t. The results are summarized in table 4 (the
dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy variable). Linear probability model results
indicate that the only variable exhibiting a statistically signicant discontinuity at either the 1
% or 5 % level is that indicating whether a rm has grown. The estimate suggests that threshold
rms expanded 1.7 percentage points less than would be expected using information on rms
just below the quota threshold. However, this result is neither economically signicant nor very
robust. Adding a second order term in rm size leads to an insignicant threshold eect on rm
growth (table 4 column (2)).15
Table 4 about here
With regard to pre-determined variables, we study whether rm age, industry, and rm loca-
tion exhibit any discontinuity at the threshold. The baseline model with a linear t in rm size S
is used for this purpose. Figure 3 shows the discontinuities together with the corresponding 95%
condence intervals (with standard errors clustered on rm size and rm) at quota threshold
T = 25. With the exception of one region (Vorarlberg), none of the rm characteristics dis-
play signicantly dierent means for quota threshold rms when compared to rms just below
the quota threshold.16 We nonetheless investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to
adding these rm characteristics. Including information on the rms in our sample can also lead
to a reduction in the noise and potentially produce more precise estimates.
Figure 3 about here
5 Econometric Results
Main Results for Quota Threshold T = 25: This section presents the main economet-
ric estimates of the eects of the DPEA on the number of disabled workers per rm at quota
15For pooled quota thresholds T > 25 we conduct the same tests for self{selection as for quota threshold
T = 25. Results are displayed in table 5 in the appendix. The coecients are neither economically nor statistically
signicant.
16With the exception of two regions (Burgenland and again, Vorarlberg), non of the predetermined covariates
turn out to have dierent means for pooled quota thresholds T > 25 (see gure 4 in the appendix).
15threshold T = 25 (for the eect of the employment quota at thresholds higher than T = 25 see
further below).17 Figure 5 reports the number of disabled workers per rm by rm size for sizes
ranging from 13 to 37. The evidence is based on 442,788 rm-month observations, providing
information on the employment decisions of 25,687 rms. Descriptive evidence indicates that
the average number of disabled workers employed by rms below the quota threshold is lower
than the the number of disabled workers employed by rms subject to the quota. Specically,
rms that employ 13 non-disabled workers oer about 0.14 workplaces to disabled workers {
1 out of 7 rms provides employment to disabled workers. In contrast, rms that employ 24
non-disabled workers provide 0.3 jobs to disabled workers. Figure 5 also suggests an approx-
imately linear increase in the mean number of jobs provided to disabled workers as rm size
increases. Strikingly, quota threshold rms with 25 non-disabled workers appear to oer 0.35
jobs to disabled workers, an unexpected increase, given the behavior of rms not subject to the
employment obligation. Again, the number of jobs provided to disabled workers increases in an
almost linear fashion from rm size 25 to rm size 37.
Figure 5 about here
Figure 5 thus presents evidence of an unexpected change in the average number of jobs provided
to disabled individuals. This change can be measured by superimposing the t of the baseline
model. Doing so yields a discontinuity at the quota threshold T = 25 of 0.0521 (standard
error clustered on rm size is 0.0078; standard error clustered on rm size and rm is 0.0140).
This discontinuity is statistically signicant at the 1%-level, but the eect appears to be rather
small. However, the mean number of disabled workers per rm around the rst threshold is 0.25,
meaning that the discontinuity constitutes a 20.6% increase in the number of disabled workers
per rm (= 0:0521=0:2526). Put dierently, roughly one out of 20 rms employs one additional
disabled worker due to the DPEA.18
Table 6 shows our main results for the eect of the employment quota on jobs provided to
disabled workers. Note rst that the choice of clustering on the rm size, or on the rm size
and rm, does not aect the statistical signicance of our results in any of the 5 columns.
Column 1 simply repeats the results from gure 5 and constitutes our baseline specication.
17We put our main focus to this threshold for two reasons. First, rms at higher order thresholds are already
subject to the quota system. Studying the rst threshold allows analyzing the eects of being subject to or free
of the quota system. Second, there are many fewer rms at higher order thresholds than at the rst threshold.
This means that the rst threshold is the most relevant threshold in terms of the number of rms subject to the
quota.
18Moreover, gure 5 also provides supplementary evidence concerning endogenous self-selection of rms below
the threshold. Arguably, rms that face strong diculties in accommodating a disabled worker and that self-select
below the quota threshold would tend to decrease the mean number of jobs provided to displaced workers just
below the quota threshold, i.e. this would show up as an unexpected dip in the number of disabled jobs just below
the quota threshold. In contrast, results in gure 5 suggest that rms just failing the quota threshold employ
slightly more disabled individuals than would be expected from a linear regression modeling the behavior of rms
below the quota threshold. This evidence is not consistent with the self-selection of rms with respect to their
likelihood of providing employment for disabled workers.
16The validity of RD estimates hinges on the appropriate specication of the relationship between
rm size and the number of disabled workers. If this relationship is misspecied, an apparent
jump at the threshold might simply be a marked nonlinearity. Column 2 adds quadratic terms
in excess rm size Sit 25. The result indicates that the eect of 0.0351 is somewhat weaker, but
remains statistically signicant at the 1%-level. In Column 3, we add all covariates displayed
in Panel B-D of table 2 as well as time-dummies as controls and re-estimate the discontinuity.
Results indicate that controlling for these covariates does not change size and signicance of the
treatment eect. This conrms our nding from section 4 that control variables are balanced at
the quota threshold. Another issue is the sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth. In the rst three
columns in table 6, we use the baseline bandwidth, i.e. we use rm-month observations with rm
size S 2 [13;37]. We narrow the rm size bandwidth by one fourth (i.e. S 2 [16;34], thereby
losing one third of all rm-month observations) in column 4 and by one-half (i.e. S 2 [19;31],
thereby losing almost two-thirds of all rm-month observations) in column 5. From column 4, we
infer that considering only rm-month observations with rm sizes Si 2 [16;34] the magnitude
of the eect reduces from 0.0521 to 0.0434. Considering only rm sizes S 2 [19;31] in column 5
further decreases the eect to 0.0381. Both eects remain statistically highly signicant at the
1%-level, however.19
Table 6 about here
Is this eect quantitatively large? A lower bound on the extent to which rms substitute
disabled workers and non-disabled workers can be calculated as follows. The lowest estimate of
the treatment eect suggests that the quota leads to 0.0351 more disabled workers holding a job
in threshold rms { an increase of about 12 % compared to the recognized disabled workforce
of 0.30 disabled workers at the quota threshold. This change in disabled worker employment is
triggered by a non-compliance tax which stands on the order of 8 % of the median non-disabled
worker wage (e 150 in ne per month relative to about e 1800 in wages per month). The
elasticity of substitution between disabled workers and non-disabled workers is therefore at least
on the order of 1.4 (= 12=[(150=1;800)  100]). As Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) conjectures,
disabled and non-disabled workers are quite strong substitutes.
Placebo and Robustness: To further assess the validity of our RD setup, we estimated
discontinuities in the number of disabled workers per rm at rm sizes where there should be
19Estimates of the causal eect of the employment quota on the employment of disabled workers are somewhat
sensitive to functional form and bandwidth choice. The statistical reason for this sensitivity is due to the fact
that threshold quota rms with 25 non-disabled workers provide fewer jobs for disabled workers than would be
expected from a linear regression using rms with 26 to 37 non-disabled workers. Introducing higher order terms
in rm size or restricting bandwidth means putting more weight on threshold rms. This reduces the estimate of
the causal eect of the employment quota. We show below that this is consistent with lags in rms' employment
decisions.
17no discontinuities. For this purpose, we focus on observations with rm sizes lower than 24,
i.e. we only considered rms not aected by the employment quota. We used the baseline
model, but narrowed the rm size bandwidth by one half (i.e. Si 2 [ T   6;  T], with placebo
thresholds  T 2 f7;8;:::;18g). Figure 6 reports the results. Figure 6A (plot of the discontinuities
and corresponding 95% condence interval) shows that the discontinuities at the 12 placebo
thresholds uctuate between -0.01 and 0.01. Moreover, only the discontinuities at rm sizes
12 and 13 are statistically signicant at the 5%-level. They amount to 0.0086 and 0.0136,
respectively. However, this is rather small in comparison to the discontinuity in the number of
disabled workers per rm of 0.0381 at the rst threshold derived from the same specication (see
table 6, panel A, column 5) Figure 6B illustrates this. It shows the density of discontinuities at
placebo thresholds and also indicates the discontinuity at the true threshold. This suggests that
the nding for the true threshold is not a statistical artifact.
Figure 6 about here
Next, we assess whether the results are sensitive to the choice of the dependent variable. In-
stead of using the number of disabled workers per rm, we could also have dened the dependent
variable as the percentage of disabled employees in each rm. One can argue that when the
number of disabled workers per rm is expressed in percentages, the results may be less sensitive
to misspecications of the relationship between the number of disabled workers and the rm
size. Table 7 displays the results. Note that it is organized in the same way as table 6. Column
1 shows the baseline eect. Firms employ 0.1819 percentage points more disabled workers than
they would in the absence of the employment quota. For a rm just above threshold T = 25, this
eect translates into 0.0455 disabled workers (= (0:181925)=100). This is perfectly in line with
our previous ndings (as are the results in columns 2{5), which suggests that our results are not
sensitive to how the dependent variable is dened (i.e. whether disabled workers are expressed in
levels numbers or percentages). Evidence in table 7 again suggests that the elasticity of substi-
tution between disabled and non-disabled workers is at least 1.3 (= 11=[(150=1;800)100]). This
estimate is somewhat lower than the baseline estimate because the number of disabled workers
strongly increases with rm size, whereas the percentage disabled workers does not change with
rm size.
Table 7 about here
Dynamics: Up until now, we have analyzed the data using a static RD approach (applied to
repeated cross{sectional data). This allows estimating the long run eect of being subject to
the non-compliance tax on the demand for disabled workers free of bias from the correlation of
being treated and observed rm characteristics. In the real world, rms need time to adjust their
18workforces. There are at least four reasons why excess employment would build up over time.
First, threshold rms may not be fully informed about the employment obligation. Second,
threshold rms may need time to search and/or to provide workplace accommodation to ll a
job vacancy with a disabled worker. Third, threshold rms may only be able to learn over time
whether they have only temporarily or permanently crossed the quota threshold. Fourth, excess
employment may also build up over time due to retention. If the non-compliance tax drives
a wedge between the separation rate of disabled workers in threshold rms compared to their
colleagues in rms below the threshold, excess employment levels will diverge slowly over time.
This section now investigates short{ and medium{run eects (up to 24 months) at the quota
threshold T = 25.
For the long{run eect, we used a sample that was restricted to rm{month observations in
a rm size bracket of Sit 2 [13;37]. We extend this original sample to cover rms in the rm
size bracket Sit 2 [1;100] in order to comprehensively exploit the panel structure of the data,
i.e. 5,176,476 rm{month observations (233,775 rms).20 Table 8 reports the results.21 Column
1 corresponds to the baseline specication (1). Results agree almost one{to{one with our main
result of column 1 in table 6 with respect to the coecient as well as standard error. This
suggests that extending the sample selection does not aect estimates of the long-run eect
of being subject to the employment quota. Column 2 adds rm xed eects to the baseline
regression. The treatment eect collapses to 0.0161, i.e. only to one{third of the baseline eect,
but remains statistically signicant at the 1 %{level. This suggest that either unobserved rm
heterogeneity or timing of employment decisions or both may play an important role in driving
the baseline results.
To study the timing of employment decisions, column 3 of table 8 adds an interaction term
between the treatment indicator and the number of months a rm has been treated up to t. The
main eect of being at the employment quota threshold is not statistically signicant. Yet the
interaction term stands at 0.0009 and is statistically signicant at the 5 %{level. This means
that rms do not immediately respond to the employment quota. However, the longer a rm is
exposed to the quota, the more it expands employment of disabled workers. For instance, the
excess demand for disabled workers amounts to 0.0301 (= 0:0085+240:0009) after 24 months,
or to about two{thirds of the long{run eect from the static RD approach (table 6). Column 4
provides results of a 24 month dierence specication of the baseline model (1). The idea behind
this regression is to examine employment of disabled individuals by rms up to 24 months after
crossing the employment quota threshold T = 25. Results indicate that this eect amounts to
20The results presented in this section are robust to this adjustment in the sample selection (none of the results
change if we use only rms in the rm size bracket Sit 2 [13;37]).
21The regressions neither contain control variables nor time xed{eects. Note that adding them does not
change the results presented in this section.
190.0276 (statistically signicant at the 1 %{level), which is consistent with our nding in column
3.
Table 8
Figure 7 shows the treatment eects (and the corresponding 95{% condence interval) for lag{
 dierences with  2 f1;2;3;:::;24g.22 We see that the eect for the rst dierence amounts
to only 0.0059, but increases steadily with  to 0.0276 at  = 24 (the treatment eects are
statistically signicant at the 5 %{level for all possible values of ). Results in gure 7 provide
evidence that rms respond sluggishly to the employment quota. This is consistent with ndings
from the xed eects model. Taken together, dynamic results (columns 3 and 4 of table 8) suggest
that sluggish adjustment to employment quota rather than unobserved heterogeneity in rms
explains why xed eects results (column 2 of table 8) are weaker than level results in (column
1 of table 8).
Figure 7 about here
Extensions: Next, we turn to discussing heterogeneity of the treatment eect. Table 9 reports
the causal eect of the employment quota for rms in dierent parts of the rm wage distribution
at quota threshold T = 25. We group rms according to the median daily wage paid to their
workers in the period 1999 to 2001. We then allocate each rm{month observation to four
approximately equal sized groups based on the quartiles of the rm wage distribution. This
grouping ensures that the relative size of the non-compliance tax decreases strongly. Whereas
the average rm in the rst quartile face a tax of 12.9 % of its rm wage, rms in the top quartile
only face a tax of 5.5 % of the rm wage (bottom row in table 9).
Table 9 about here
Results indicate that the employment quota produces a strong increase in the workplaces
available to disabled workers among rms located in the rst quartile of the wage distribution.
Quota rms provide 0.089 workplaces for disabled workers which would not be there without the
employment quota (column 1). The employment eect of the employment obligation is similarly
strong among rms located in the second quartile of the rm wage distribution. These rms
generate excess employment on the order of 0.072 workplaces provided to registered disabled
workers (column 2). High-wage rms located above the median of the rm wage distribution
respond considerably less than rms below the median. Threshold rms in the third quartile
22Note that the number of observations (almost linearly) decreases from originally 4,899,035 rm{month ob-
servations for the lag{1 regression to only 781,068 rm{month observations for the lag{24 dierence regression,
which explains why the condence interval widens with .
20provide employment in excess of what would be expected from rms just below the threshold
of 0.042 workplaces (column 3) { or about half the workplaces created by rms in the rst
quartile of the rm wage distribution. Interestingly, rms in the top quartile of the rm wage
distribution do not appear to respond to the employment obligation (the estimated eect in
column 4 is 0.0099). Note that the pattern of causal eects of the employment quota are very
much in line with the pattern of relative impact generated by a at rate tax. Moreover, except for
the top quartile, results consistently suggest that the elasticity of substitution between disabled
and non-disabled workers exceeds 2.
We further look at the eect of heterogeneity with respect to industry aliation. Figure 8
displays the discontinuities in the number of disabled workers per rm for each industry at the
quota threshold T = 25. The y-axis on the left hand side measures the discontinuities and the
corresponding 95% condence intervals (clustered on rm size) using the specication of column
1 in table 6. The y-axis on the right hand side measures the number of rm-month observations
used for the calculations. Figure 8 reveals that the treatment eect is only somewhat heteroge-
nous across industries at the threshold. The manufacturing industry reacts most strongly to
the nancial incentives created by the DPEA. Treated rms belonging to this industry employ
0.0812 disabled workers more than non-treated rms. The second-largest eect is estimated for
the tourism industry with a discontinuity of 0.0509, then the construction industry with 0.0436,
and nally the service industry with the lowest, however still important, eect of 0.0375. All
calculated discontinuities at the rst threshold are statistically signicant at the 5%-level. There
are several reasons why the quota generates slightly more employment in manufacturing than in
the services or construction sector. On one hand, manufacturing is probably less labor intensive
compared to construction and services. Thus, reduction in physical labor capacity are less likely
to be relevant in manufacturing.
Figure 8 about here
The employment quota may also act dierently for large rms than for small rms. On one
hand, large rms pay higher wages, implying that nancial incentives should have less bite
than for small rms. On the other hand, existing evidence strongly suggests that rm size is
positively related to employment of the disabled. This may be because large rms nd it easier
to accommodate disabled workers. Table 10 shows the results for pooled higher order thresholds
(50, 75, ...). Here we assign treatment status according to the deviation from thresholds ~ Sit 
(Sit   T), where T represents the nearest threshold Sit is associated with. Firms are treated if
~ Si  0 and non-treated if ~ Si < 0). Column 1 in table 10 displays the baseline eect at the quota
threshold (we repeat the estimate in column 1 of table 6 for ease of comparison). Column 2
shows the eect of the employment quota on the number of disabled workers per rm at pooled
21quota thresholds T > 25.23 The eect of having to oer a job to at least one additional disabled
worker is 0.1118 { more than twice as large as the baseline eect at quota threshold T = 25 and
statistically signicant at the 1 %{level. Put dierently, roughly one in ten rms employs one
additional disabled worker due to the DPEA. From column 3 we infer that the result in column
2 is not sensitive to adding controls and time xed{eects. Column 4 uses the percentage of
disabled workers per rm as dependent variable instead of the level. The eect amounts to
0.1218 percentage points and is statistically signicant at the 1 %{level. This translates into
an eect of 0.1486 (= 0:001218  122) disabled workers for the average rm in the large rm
sample. Thus, our result that the treatment eect is roughly twice as large as for rms around
quota thresholds T > 25 than for rms around quota threshold T = 25 is quite robust. What is
the substitution elasticity in large rms? Firms in the pooled sample pay about 1950 e { the
non-compliance tax is about 7.7 % of the median non-disabled worker wage. The employment
eect is on the order of 5.3 % of average disabled worker employment. The substitution elasticity
is therefore on the order of 0.7 for large rms { somewhat lower than among small rms.
Table 10 about here
In table 6 above, we showed that treated rms employ 0.0521 disabled workers more than non-
treated rms at threshold T = 25. Table 11 discusses how threshold rms provide employment
to disabled workers. To do this, we decompose employment provided to disabled workers who
had been employed with the same rm on the date of registration as disabled (own former
employees), who had been employed with another rm on the date of registratoin as disabled
(other former employees), and who had not been employed at the time of registration as disabled
(non-employees).
Providing information on the eects for these three groups of workers is important. Own
former employees were already employed with the current employer before attaining the status
of being disabled. This means that the current employer is, arguably, quite well informed about
the disabled individual's on-the-job productivity. Moreover, seeing an increase in workplaces
provided to individuals formerly employed by the current rm allow discussing the eects of
DPEA on retention, i.e. the eect of keeping workers on the payroll who would not have been
kept without the employment obligation. Other former employees were not working for the
current employer. Thus, the current employer does not have as good information regarding
on-the-job skills as for own former employees. Moreover, information on other former employees
allows an examination of the role of DPEA in reallocating jobs between the current rm and
other dierent rms. Non-employees were not working on the date of they attained status
23Column 2 neither includes control variables nor time xed{eects but columns 2{4 do include dummies for
the threshold closest to each rm-month observation to control for dierences in disabled employment across
thresholds.
22as disabled. The current employer therefore has equally poor information regarding the hired
person's on-the-job productivity as for an individual hired from another rm. Yet, in contrast
to results for other former employees, non-employees are not poached from other employers.
Employment eects for non-employees therefore speak to the role of DPEA in increasing hiring
from the non-employment pool.
Table 11 provides information on the separate eects of DPEA on workers of dierent types.
Column 1 in table 11 displays the baseline eect at the quota threshold T = 25 (we repeat
the estimate in column 1 of table 6 for ease of comparison). Columns 2 to 4 provide separate
estimates for workers who had been employed by the current rm (column 2), workers who
had been employed by a dierent rm (column 3), and workers who had not been employed
at the time of registration as disabled (column 4). Results in column 2 suggest that quota
threshold rms employ 0.026 more disabled workers who had already been working for the
rm before becoming recognized as disabled. This means that about 50 % of the baseline
treatment eect at the quota threshold goes to workers whose productivity is, arguably, quite
well known to the current employer. The resulting excess employment reects the role of DPEA
in increasing retention of existing employees. Results in column 3 indicate that quota rms
tend to have 0.021 more employees on their payrolls who had been employed in dierent rms
when becoming recognized as disabled. This means that up to 42 % of the treatment eect
goes to workers whose productivity is less well known to the current employer. Moreover, the
resulting excess employment eect is likely to reect reallocation of jobs from non-quota rms
to quota rms. Results in column 4 indicate that 0.004 jobs in quota rms go to individuals
who were not employed when entering the disabled status. This means that about 8 % of
the excess employment gain reects employment gains going to individuals whose productivity
cannot easily be inferred. In sum, about 50 % of excess employment at quota threshold rms
is directed to workers whose productivity is well known to the current employer. This is in line
with a priori expectations concerning the role of information on productivity. Moreover, more
than half of excess employment reects retention and pure job creation for the non-employed.
This means that DPEA indeed promotes employment of disabled workers.
Table 11 about here
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the eect of an employment quota in promoting employment for disabled
workers. While there is a considerable literature on the eects of anti-discrimination legislation,
convincing causal evidence of employment quota systems is almost non-existent. Our paper
makes a rst attempt to understand the employment quota for disabled workers and, in doing
23so, complements existing evidence on anti-discrimination legislation. The identication strategy
relies on the sharp discontinuity in the relative costs of employing disabled workers created in
a quota system combined with taxes raised on rms that do not comply with legal employment
requirements.
Our empirical results indicate that the quota promotes the employment of disabled workers
in rms located at the quota threshold, in comparison to rms just below the quota threshold.
The quota leads to excess employment of one disabled worker per 20 rms. Firms respond
sluggishly to the quota, creating about one job per 50 rms in one year. We also detect important
interactions between wages, industry, and rm size. Firms in the lower end of the rm wage
distribution tend to provide most of the excess employment to disabled workers. In terms of
industry, the employment gain tends to be concentrated in capital intensive manufacturing rather
than in labor intensive sectors such as services, tourism, or construction. The employment quota
leads to twice as much excess employment among large rms rather than among small rms.
We also nd that the quota boosts employment primarily among former employees of the rm.
The quota also encourages rms to poach workers from other rms and to hire individuals who
were not formerly employed.
We conclude that the nancial sanctions accompanying the employment quota do indeed in-
crease compliance with the quota. This is a rst result that is necessary for the quota to promote
overall employment for disabled workers. We also show that the quota employment eect is not
entirely due to reallocation of disabled workers between rms. Taken together, these results
suggest that overall disabled employment may increase due to the employment quota. However,
the employment quota may displace non-disabled workers, thereby potentially decreasing overall
employment. Further research should therefore put emphasis on evaluating this policy instru-
ment in other contexts and compare the relative eectiveness of quota with anti-discrimination
legislation.
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26A Tables
Table 1: OECD Countries with Employment Quotas
Country Quota Targeted rms Sanction
Austria 4% private and public employers with over
25 employees
e 200.- per month for each place
not lled (0.4% of payroll)
Belgium 2{2.5% only public employers {
France 6% public and private employers with over
19 employees
e 150{250 per month (0.45{0.75%
of payroll)
Germany 5% public and private employers with over
19 employees
e 100{250.- per month for each
place not lled, depending on ful-
lment (0.25{0.65% of payroll)
Italy 7% public and private employers with over
50 workers, one/two places for 15{
35/36{50 employees
e 1,075.- per month for each place
not lled (4% of payroll)
Korea 2% public sector and private employers
with over 300 employees
e 324.- per month for each place
not lled (0.5% of payroll)
Poland 6% public sector and private employers
with over 50 employees
40.65% of average wage per month
for each place not lled (2.4% of
payroll)
Spain 2% public sector and private employers
with over 50 employees
{
Source: OECD (2003)
27Table 2: Descriptive Statistics around Quota Threshold T = 25
rm size 13-24 rm size 25-37
mean (std. dev.) mean (std. dev.)
Panel A: Outcome and treatment assignment variable
number of disabled 0.19 (0.54) 0.42 (0.86)
rm size 17.10 (3.33) 30.13 (3.71)
Panel B: Firms' uctuation and growth w.r.t. non-disabled workforce
unchanged workforce since last month
? 0.41 (0.49) 0.25 (0.43)
expanded since 6 months
? 0.45 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50)
contracted since 6 months
? 0.34 (0.47) 0.39 (0.49)
Panel C: Other covariates
share of white-collar workers
? 0.44 (0.34) 0.44 (0.34)
share of women
? 0.41 (0.29) 0.38 (0.28)
worker's age
? (in years) 35.42 (4.96) 35.68 (4.56)
median daily wage
? (e) 59.82 (19.93) 62.55 (19.91)
tenure
? (in years) 5.32 (3.67) 5.59 (3.66)
number of apprentices
? 1.37 (2.23) 2.04 (3.22)
Panel D: Pre-determined covariates
age of rm (in years) 15.91 (10.24) 16.92 (10.18)
Vienna 0.22 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42)
Lower Austria 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38)
Burgenland 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.18)
Upper Austria 0.17 (0.37) 0.18 (0.38)
Styria 0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30)
Carinthia 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.25)
Salzburg 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27)
Tyrol 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29)
Vorarlberg 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
services 0.45 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50)
manufacturing 0.28 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46)
construction 0.17 (0.37) 0.17 (0.38)
tourism 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29)
Number of rm{month observations 328,020 114,768
Number of rms 22,368 8,908
Total number of rms 25,687
Notes:
? denotes that variable bases on characteristics of non-disabled workers only.
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO.






rm size 13-24 rm size 25-37
mean (std. dev.) mean (std. dev.)
Panel A: Outcome and treatment assignment variable
rm size 102.31 (111.89) 130.15 (126.47)
number of disabled 1.81 (4.30) 2.44 (5.26)
Panel B: Firms' uctuation and growth w.r.t non-disabled workforce
unchanged workforce since last month
? 0.11 (0.31) 0.07 (0.26)
expanded since 6 months
? 0.50 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50)
contracted since 6 months
? 0.41 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49)
Panel C: Other covariates
share of white-collar workers
? 0.45 (0.33) 0.45 (0.32)
share of women
? 0.37 (0.27) 0.37 (0.27)
worker's age
? (in years) 36.07 (4.04) 36.24 (3.93)
median daily wage
? (e) 64.82 (20.56) 65.50 (20.80)
tenure
? (in years) 6.09 (3.74) 6.33 (3.80)
number of apprentices
? 4.27 (7.83) 5.22 (9.15)
Panel D: Pre-determined covariates
age of rm (in years) 18.60 (10.08) 19.25 (10.01)
Vienna 0.22 (0.42) 0.22 (0.42)
Lower Austria 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38)
Burgenland 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16)
Upper Austria 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39)
Styria 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30)
Carinthia 0.06 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25)
Salzburg 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27)
Tyrol 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.28)
Vorarlberg 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
services 0.45 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50)
manufacturing 0.35 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48)
construction 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34)
tourism 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22)
Number of rm-month observations 118,192 90,475
Number of rms 9,117 6,746
Total number of rms 9,475
Notes:
? denotes that variable bases on characteristics of non-disabled workers only.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD and FWO.
29Table 4: Discontinuities in Firms' Turnover and Growth at Quota Threshold T = 25
(1) (2)
stable workforce since last month 0.0118 0.0019
(cluster: rm size) (0.0069) (0.0068)
(cluster: rm size and rm) (0.0073) (0.0069)
[R
2] [0.0286] [0.0287]
expanded since 6 months -0.0170 0.0043
(cluster: rm size) (0.0080)
?? (0.0040)
(cluster: rm size and rm) (0.0087) (0.0054)
[R
2] [0.0010] [0.0012]
contracted since 6 months 0.0050 -0.0005
(cluster: rm size) (0.0049) (0.0049)
(cluster: rm size and rm) (0.0059) (0.0060)
[R
2] [0.0025] [0.0025]
Polynomial order 1 2
Number of observations 442,788
Notes:
???,
?? denotes signicance at the 1% , 5% level respectively.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
Table 5: Discontinuities in Firms' Turnover and Growth at Pooled Quota Thresholds T > 25
stable workforce since last month 0.0021 -0.0072
(cluster: rm size) (0.0047) (0.0069)
(cluster: rm size and rm) (0.0050) (0.0068)
[R
2] [0.0485] [0.0485]
expanded since 6 months -0.0020 0.0065
(cluster: rm size) (0.0045) (0.0052)
(cluster: rm size and rm) (0.0058) (0.0057)
[R
2] [0.0021] [0.0021]
contracted since 6 months 0.0028 0.0006
(cluster: rm size) (0.0033) (0.0043)




Polynomial order 1 2
Number of observations 208,667
Notes:
???,
?? denotes signicance at the 1% , 5% level respectively.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
























Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO














































































































































Discontinuities calculated by model 1 (linear fit).
95%−CI based on standard errors clustered on firm size and firm.
 
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD
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Discontinuities calculated by model 1 (linear fit).
95%−CI based on standard errors clustered on firm size and firm.
 
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD
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firm size
discontinuity at threshold = .0521 with std.err. = .0078 (clustered on firm size),
based on baseline model (N = 442788)
 
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO.





































































Discontinuities calculated by baseline model (linear fit).
95%−CI based on standard errors clustered on firm size and firm.
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lag−x difference [i.e. y_t − y_(t−x)]
Treatment Effect 95%−CI
 
95%−CI bases on robust standard errors.
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
Figure 7: The Eect of the DPEA on the Number of Disabled Workers at Quota Threshold
















































Discontinuities calculated by model with linear fit.
95%−CI based on standard errors clustered on firm size.
 
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
Figure 8: Employment Eects by Industry at Quota Threshold T = 25
41